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Among the many environmental problems facing Australia, the problems 
of managing the Murray-Darling Basin and of responding to climate change are 
notable for their complexity, intractability and for the wide range of people and 
regions  affected.  Consideration  of  policy  successes  and  failures  in  the 
management of the Murray-Darling Basin may help in the design of a more 
effective, and cost-effective, response to the problem of climate change2
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Managing the Murray–Darling  Basin: some implications for 
climate change policy
Among the many environmental problems facing Australia, the problems 
of managing the Murray-Darling Basin and of responding to climate change are 
notable for their complexity, intractability and for the wide range of people and 
regions  affected.  Both  have  been  the  subject  of  extensive  debate  and  policy 
attention  for  at  least  the  past  fifteen  years.  In  both  cases,  however,  the 
problems  remain  largely  unresolved,  and  crucial  policy  measures,  though 
accepted in principle, have yet to be implemented in practice.
The problems of the Murray-Darling Basin were recognised earlier, and 
rather more progress has been made towards resolving some of the key issues. 
In  hindsight,  however,  it  is  clear  that  the  policy  process  has  been  far  from 
satisfactory. Consideration of policy successes and failures in the management 
of the Murray-Darling Basin may help in the design of a more effective, and 
cost-effective, response to the problem of climate change.
It is also important to consider interactions between the problems of the 
Murray-Darling Basin and problems of adaption to climate change. There is a 
significant likelihood that the severe drought conditions that have prevailed for 
most of the 21st century so far reflect in part, a drying of the climate of South-
Eastern Australia associated with human-caused climate change (Wentworth 
Group of Concerned Scientists 2006).
Expansion, maturity and crisis
Randall  (1981)  suggest  that  the  evolution  of  policy  regarding  water 
resources  may  be  divided  into  two  phases:  an  expansionary  phase,  and  a 
mature phase. An expansionary water economy is characterised by relatively 
low  social  cost  of  expanded  water  use,  in  total  and  at  the  margin.  In  such 
circumstances, the welfare cost of subsidies to water use is small. Investment in 
infrastructure  is  primarily  directed  towards  expanding  supply.  When  the 
expansionary phase reaches its inevitable end, and a mature water economy 3
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emerges,  the  problem  of  managing  the  resource  is  complicated  by  the 
persistence of policies inherited from the expansionary phase. 
In the case of the Murray–Darling Basin, Quiggin (2001) argued that the 
expansionary phase coincided with the operation of the River Murray Waters 
Agreement from 1915 to 1987, while the mature phase began with the adoption 
of the Murray–Darling Basin Agreement. Subsequent elements of the mature 
phase have included the imposition, in 1994, of ‘the Cap’, a limit on aggregate 
diversions of water from the Murray–Darling Basin and the announcement, in 
2004,  of  the  National  Water  Initiative,  a  co-operative  project  involving 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments with a primary focus on the 
Murray–Darling Basin (Council of Australian Governments 2004).
It is arguable, however, that recent events indicate that, rather than a 
steady approach to maturity, policy regarding the Murray–Darling Basin has 
entered  a  crisis  phase.  There  is  widespread  agreement  that  existing  policy 
responses  have  been  inadequate.  However,  there  is  no  corresponding 
agreement  on  an  appropriate  policy  response,  or  even  on  the  political 
framework within which such a response should be formulated.
The  emergence  of  a  crisis,  is  a  common  signal  of  the  end  of  the 
expansionary phase in the management of water resources, and other natural 
resources.  In  some  cases,  the  immediate  crisis  is  resolved  and  a  ‘mature’ 
economy emerges, leading eventually to the emergence of a sustainable system 
of governance. In other cases, there is no such resolution and the expansionary 
phase  is  brought  to  a  halt  by  the  partial  or  total  collapse  of  the  resource 
concerned.  It  remains  to  be  seen  which  of  these  outcomes  will  occur  in  the 
Murray-Darling Basin.
Water rights: the panacea that wasn’t
The  outlook  for  water  policy  in  Australia  was  considerably  more 
optimistic fifteen years ago. The beginning of the mature phase in Australian 
water policy coincided with the high point of market-oriented microeconomic 
reform. The most important single initiative of the reform process launched in 4
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the 1990s was part of the National Competition Policy agreement reached at 
the Council of Australian Governments in 1994. The policy approach adopted 
there reflected the faith in markets, and disregard of institutional constraints 
that characterized public policy, including National Competition Policy, at this 
time. In particular, the 1994 reforms introduced some but not all elements of a 
water market, with inadequate regard for issues of governance and sequencing, 
or for the sustainability of existing allocations (Bell and Quiggin 2007).
The  first  step  in  the  reform  process  was  to  convert  existing  water 
licenses , attached to particular parcels of land, into tradeable property rights, 
with  an  expectation  (eventually  fulfilled)  that  these  rights  would  become 
permanent.  The  assumption  underlying  this  reform  was  that  trade  would 
permit water to be allocated to its most valuable use, thereby ensuring a range 
of socially optimal outcomes. 
There were a number of problems with this analysis. First, the policy 
generated a substantial increase in the value of rights that had previously been 
given away, in part because of the assumption that, being licenses, they could 
be withdrawn if necessary. The problem was most evident with ‘sleeper’ and 
‘dozer’ licenses. ‘Sleeper’ licenses were those that had never been used, while 
‘dozers’ had some history of use, but were inactive at the time of the reforms.
Because sleeper and dozer licenses had the same legal status as other 
licenses, they were converted into tradeable property rights. That is, a limited 
right  conditional,  in  many  cases,  on  the  development  of  irrigation 
infrastructure  was  turned  into  an  unconditional  claim  on  scarce  water.  The 
effect  was  to  increase  the  severity  of  the  overallocation  problem  that  was 
already well known. Quiggin 2007)
It was expected that trade would help to solve the problem. In particular, 
it  was  assumed,  somewhat  naively  that  if  use  of  water  for  irrigation  was 
excessive, environmentalists or governments could bid for water to be used for 
environmental flows.
In  reality,  while  a  market  for  temporary  water  transfers  emerged 
rapidly, markets for permanent water transfers have remained thin. Moreover, 5
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transfers  of  water  rights  between  catchments  have  been  constrained  by 
concerns  about  asset  stranding  and  adverse  impacts  on  regional  economic 
activity. Equally importantly, in the decade following the COAG reforms, there 
was  no  movement  towards  the  purchase  of  water  rights  for  environmental 
flows. Environmental flows remained a residual demand to be satisfied after 
higher-priority claims had been met.
The most effective component of the 1994 reforms was the ‘Cap’ which 
required that average extractions of water for irrigation use in each catchment 
should  be  no  higher  than  the  level  prevailing  when  the  Cap  was  imposed. 
Initially  intended  as  a  temporary  measure,  the  Cap  has  remained  a  central 
feature  of  policy  ever  since.  Attempts  to  develop  scientific  estimates  of 
sustainable yields of water for each catchment are only just beginning (CSIRO 
2007 ). Until this process is complete, the Cap remains the primary constraint 
preventing further unsustainable expansion.
However, the Cap initially applied only to extractions from streams. The 
creation of tradeable water rights encouraged rent-seeking in the form of the 
appropriation  of  unpriced  sources  of  water,  including  surface  flows  and 
groundwater.  Over  time,  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the  extraction  of 
groundwater and the use of farm dams and other devices to capture surface 
flows. 
However,  as  with  other  large-scale  reforms,  the  problem  was  one  of 
sequencing. The creation of fully tradeable water rights should have been the 
final stage of the reforms, after sustainable levels of use had been identified for 
all stages of the water cycle. The premature conversion of revocable licenses 
into property rights derailed the reform process for a decade or more. 
The National Water Initiative
By 2004, events including drought had exposed significant deficiencies 
in both urban and rural water policy in Australia. The response was another 
agreement  emerging  from  the  COAG  process,  the  National  Water  Initiative 
(Council  of  Australian  Governments  2004),  which  subsumed  the  the  Living 6
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Murray program established by the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council 
in 2002. As regards irrigation, two issues were central to the National Water 
Initiative .
The first was the development of permanent trade in water rights, and 
in particular interstate water trade. Despite earlier difficulties, the National 
Water Initiative was premised on a commitment to convert water entitlements 
into  fully  tradeable    property  rights  and  to  facilitate  the  development  of 
markets for those rights.
The second was a commitment to restore environmental flows averaging 
at  least  500  GL.  Unfortunately,  this  commitment  was  not  backed  up  by  a 
willingness  to  purchase  existing  rights  from  water  users.  Instead,  it  was 
implicitly assumed that the necessary savings could be made through technical 
improvements to irrigation systems. 
Moreover, the 500 GL target was inadequate. A Scientific Review Panel, 
commissioned to assess options for restoring 500, 1000 or 1500 GL of annual 
flows to the environment (compared to median natural flows of around 10 000 
GL)  came  to  the  conclusion  that  1500GL  was  the  minimum  amount  needed 
(Jones et al 2002).
The National Plan
Only  three  years  after  the  announcement  of  the  National  Water 
Initiative,  based  on  co-operation  between  Commonwealth  and  state 
governments,  Prime  Minister  John  Howard  unilaterally  announcing  the 
National Plan for Water Security (Howard 2007). Although the National Plan 
was described as ‘accelerating the implementation of the NWI’ it amounted to 
an abandonment of the co-operative approach in favour of a Commonwealth 
takeover of water planning throughout the 
The documents supporting the Plan made clear the Commonwealth view 
that  the  NWI  had  failed  and  that  the  blame  for  this  failure  rested  almost 
entirely with the States. State governments were accused of dragging their feet 
and failing to meet agreed goals.7
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There  was,  of  course,  a  party-political  component  to  this  charge.  The 
Howard government was facing an election, and criticism of ‘wall-to-wall Labor 
governments’  formed  a  central  party  of  its  campaign  strategy.  The  National 
Water  Plan  was  one  of  a  series  of  major  initiatives  announced  in  2007  as 
responses to perceived or actual failures of State and Territory governments.
In important respects, the Commonwealth was as much to blame for the 
failure of the NWI as the States. On the crucial issue of water trading, the 
Howard  government  itself  was  divided  and  ineffectual.  Minister  for  Water 
Malcolm  Turnbull  favored  the  relaxation  of  constraints  on  trading  between 
catchments  and  between  rural  and  urban  users,  while  the  National  Party 
vigorously resisted such changes.
Nevertheless, the judgement implicit in the Plan, that the NWI was not 
working, was supported by the evidence. The first report of the National Water 
Commission, issued in November 2006 rated the states’ performance as poor or, 
at best, adequate on a wide range of issues (Turnbull 2006). 
Unfortunately,  the  Plan  was  at  least  as  ineffectual  as  the  Initiative. 
Victoria refused to accept the Commonwealth takeover, arguing that irrigators 
in Victoria, where water allocations were generally conservative, would suffer 
from being lumped in with other states, particularly New South Wales, where 
over-allocation had been widespread.
Progress on reclaiming water for the environment remained glacial. The 
main  focus  of  the  plan  was  on  the  provision  of  public  subsidies  for  on-farm 
irrigation  works  aimed  at  increasing  the  efficiency  of  water  use.  Such  an 
approach is necessarily less efficient than the purchase of water rights on the 
open market, allowing sellers of water rights to choose between on-farm works, 
changes in land allocation or switching away from irrigated agriculture.
Many  of  these  issues  remained  somewhat  academic  during  2006  and 
2007. Severe drought conditions reduced inflows to levels unprecedented in the 
recorded history of the Basin. Moreover, despite the announced budget of $10 
billion, little money was actually spent under the Plan. Given the lack of any 
coherent rationale, this was, perhaps, fortunate.8
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Resolving the crisis ?
The  election  of  the  Rudd  Labor  government  in  November  2007  has 
opened up some new possibilities for the resolution of the water in Australia 
crisis.  In  February  2007,  Minister  for  Water  Penny  Wong  announced  a  $50 
million  tender  for  the  purchase  of  irrigation  water  rights  to  be  diverted  to 
irrigation  flows.  Constrained  by  resistance  from  the  National  Party,  the 
Howard  government  had  been  unable  or  unwilling  to  take  this  obviously 
necessary step. Some limited measures had been taken by state governments, 
including  the  NSW  RiverBank  program  (Department  of  Environment  and 
Climate Change, 2008).
The  election  of  a  federal  Labor  government  also  increases  the 
possibilities  for  co-operative  agreements  with  Labor  state  governments. 
However, there is a large gap between possibilities and actual outcomes. At the 
time  of  writing  (March  2007)  agreement  between  the  Victorian  and 
Commonwealth  governments  on  management  of  the  Murray–Darling  Basin 
remained elusive.
Climate change and the MDB
Severe  drought  conditions  in  2006  and  2007  have  reduced  inflows  of 
water  to  the  Murray–Darling  river  system  to  the  lowest  levels  on  record. 
Climate models suggest that rainfall in the Murray-Darling Basin will decline 
as a result of climate change, and that, as a result, inflows to the system will 
also be reduced. 
Under the principles of the NWI, the risk of climate change should be 
borne  by  water  users.  Hence,  if  inflows  decline,  the  volume  of  water  rights 
should be scaled back accordingly. 
The  underlying  principle  is  sound,  but  many  issues  remain  to  be 
resolved. In particular, climate change is likely affect both average rainfall and 
the  frequency  of  droughts,  and  therefore  the  reliability  of  water  supply. 9
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Adjusting the allocations associated with water rights to take account of the 
resulting changes in inflows will be a complex and challenging task.
Lessons for climate policy
The successes and failures of water policy in Australia hold important 
lessons  for  policies  aimed  at  reducing  or  offsetting  emissions  of  greenhouse 
gases.  As  with  water,  an  expansionary  phase  in  which  concerns  about  the 
capacity  of  the  environment  to  absorb  CO2  emissions  were  disregarded  is 
coming to a close, and it remains to be seen whether it will be succeeded by a 
mature carbon economy, or by crisis and collapse.
Again as with water, the tradeable property rights seem certain to play 
a  central  role  in  the  global  policy  response  to  climate  change.  Thus,  the 
concerns  about  sequencing,  definition  of  rights  and  the  tradeoff  between 
flexibility and certainty will be critical in achieving a sustainable response. 
In the case of climate change, the most important implication is that 
governments  should  avoid  ‘grandfathering’  policies  that  confer  permanent 
rights on existing emitters of greenhouse gases. It is important to avoid locking 
in existing emissions by requiring excessive compensation levels.
A second important lesson is the need to ensure that controls on one 
source of emissions do not encourage the expansion of emissions from other 
sources. Requiring Australian firms to purchase emissions quotas may result in 
a shift of production to jurisdictions where emissions are uncontrolled. 
As  regards  developed  countries  that  choose  not  to  control  their 
emissions,  the  most  appropriate  response  would  be  the  imposition  of  border 
taxes  to  take  account  of  the  resulting  implied  subsidy.  In  relation  to  less 
developed countries, it is necessary to provide incentives, through the Clean 
Development Mechanism and similar devices to minimise growth in emissions.
Finally, the interaction between climate change and water policy is a 
reminder that policy issues cannot be addressed in isolation. A successful policy 
framework  must  be  sufficiently  flexible  to  take  account  of  unforeseen 10
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complications, such as the emergence of climate change as a problem for water 
policy.
Concluding comments
The  management  of  the  Murray–Darling  Basin  has  important 
implications  for  broader  resource  management  issues.  Although  the  central 
thrust of policy has been broadly correct, progress has been far slower than was 
hoped  and  expected  when  reform  began  in  the  early  1990s.  Failure  to  pay 
appropriate attention to issues of sequencing and institutional governance has 
been an important problem.   In particular, it would have been preferable to 
scale back allocations associated with water licenses before converting them to 
fully  tradeable  property  rights.    The  resulting  ‘grandfathering’  of  excessive 
allocations created problems that are only now being addressed. Designers of 
climate change policy should take care to avoid similar mistakes. 
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